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APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has played an important role in
the evolution of negligence law. Chief Baron Pollock presided at the
theory's accouchement in Bryne v. Boadle.1 In that now classic case,
plaintiff was struck by an object falling from a building. In holding
for plaintiff who was unable to show any direct evidence of negligence,
the court observed:
There are certain cases of which it must be said, res ipsa loquitur,
and this seems to be one of them. In some cases the Courts have
held that the mere fact of the accident having occurred is evidence
of negligence .... 2
The Montana Supreme Court has recently said that the evidence
must establish three "elements" before the benefits of res ipsa loquitur
can accrue to the plaintiff's cause:
(1) the accident or. occurrence producing the injury is of a
kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone's
negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an agency or instru-
mentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3)
the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.3
Realistically, this mode of proof is a common sense appraisal of
fault for an injury inflicted by the operation of an instrumentality in
the "exclusive control ' 4 of the defendant at the time of the alleged
negligence. Tactically, it has been described as a "crutch" to be em-
ployed in an otherwise "crippled case" which badly needs its support.5
As to the evidentiary effect of res ipsa loquitur, the law is now clear
that the doctrine is not an exception to the rule that the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove actionable negligence.6 However, it has been said
12 H. & 0. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
'Id. at 725, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300; fifty-four years earlier, under a different rule,
this same burden was placed on a common carried in Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng. Rep.
1088 (1809); the expression "res ipsa loquitur' may be found at an earlier date
in cases other than those involving negligence. See Roberts v. Trenayne, 1 Cro. Jac.
507 (1614).
3Gormley v. Montana Deaconess Hosp., 423 P.2d 301, 305 (Mont. 1967), citing
Horner v. Northern Pacific Beneficial Ass'n. Hospitals, Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 351, 359,
382 P.2d 518, 523 (1963).
'A recent Montana Supreme Court decision defined the concept of exclusive control as
follows:
The exclusive control spoken of does not mean actual physical control
right up to the time of the accident. It simply means that the [defend-
ants] must have had such control that it would be unlikely that other
negligence could have occurred which would have operated as an inter-
vening proximate cause of the injury complained of. Knowlton v.
Sandaker, 436 P.2d 98, 103 (Mont. 1968).
51 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 38 at 200 (1954).
'Early Montana decisions held that the doctrine placed the burden on the defendant
to prove that there had been no negligence. See e.g., Ryan v. Gilmer, 2 Mont. 517,
25 Am. Rep. 744 (1877); Dempster v. Oregon S.L.R.R. Co., 37 Mont. 335, 96 P. 717
(1908). However, the later cases have followed the Rule that the doctrine does not
cast upon the defendant the burden of disproving negligence in the sense of making
1
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that the doctrine "relieves a plaintiff from the burden of produc-
ing direct evidence of negligence,"'7 and also that the defendant has
the obligation to go forward with his proof, which is sometimes called
the "risk of non-persuasion". The doctrine does not permit recovery
on proof of the injury alone.9 Instead, the doctrine raises a disputable
presumption of law and supplies the proof necessarily wanting when
the injured party cannot disclose the cause of his injury. It requires
that it be apparent prima facie that the accident would not ordinarily
have happened had the defendant exercised ordinary care.'"
. The res ipsa loquitur theory has found application in a variety of
commonplace cases. It has been applied most often in cases involving
falling objects," explosions,'12 sudden collapses of structures,' 3 and ve-
hicle wrecks. 14 Montana courts, and federal courts applying Montana
law, have realistically decided that stagecoaches do not ordinarily over-
turn,15 gasoline does not ordinarily spill and burn,' 6 trains do not ordi-
narily derail,'7 high voltage wires do not ordinarily fall,' and patients
do not ordinarily enter operating rooms for hysterectomy operations and
emerge with broken arms'9 without giving rise to a justifiable inference
of negligence on the part of the person in control.
In this setting therefore the present study breaks down into three
distinct problems: (1) The effect of allegations of specific negligence
in the complaint upon the plaintiff's ability to rely on res ipsa loquitur
at the trial. (2) The effect of plaintiff's introducing evidence of spe-
it incumbent upon him to establish freedom from negligence by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Vonault v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, P.2d 535 (1934) ; Stocking v.
Johnson Flying Service, 143 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d 312 (1963), Gormley v. Montana
Deaconess Hosp., supra note 3.
7pFoltis v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 115, 38 N.E.2d 455, 459 (1941).
'Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241, 245 (1953).
'Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 263, 7 P.2d 228, 231 (1932).
"Stocking v. Johnson Flying Service, supra note 6.
"Gillilan v. Portland Cremation Ass'n., 120 Ore. 286, 249 P. 627 (1926) (Fall of
slab in crematorium onto child causing mother to strain herself in lifting); Glowacki
v. N.W. Ohio Ry. & Power Co., 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21, 53 A.L.R. 1486 (1927)
(High voltage wires fell on highway); Griffon v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 59 N.E. 925,
52 L.R.A. 922 (1901) (Fall of elevator in office building).
"
2 Baker v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 221, 252 P.2d 24 (1953) (Explosion of
automobile tire being mounted on a wheel); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Explosion of soft drink bottle); Alston
v. J. L. Prescott Co., 10 N.J. Super. 116, 76 A.2d 686 (1950) (Explosion of bottle
containing laundry fluid).
'3McHarge v. M. M. Newcomer & Co., 117 Tenn. App. 595, 100 S.W. 700, 9 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 298 (1907) (Collapse of awning attached to a building).
'Spinner v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 52 Cal. App.2d 679, 126 P.2d 940 (1942) (Bus-
automobile collision); Nielsen v. Pyles, 322 Ill. App. 574, 54 N.E.2d 753 (1944)
(Rear-end automobile collision); Fink v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 144 Ohio St. 1,
56 N.E.2d 456 (1944) (Train derailment).
"
5 Stiles v. Gove, 345 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1965).
"6Harding v. Johnson, Inc., 126 Mont. 70, 244 P.2d 111 (1952).
"John v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Mont. 18, 111 P. 632 (1910).
"Houle v. Helena Gas & Elec. Co., 31 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1929).
"Gormley v. Mont. Deaconess Hosp., supra note 3.
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cific negligence at trial upon his ability to rely on res ipsa loquitur
at the conclusion of the trial. (3) The effect of the doctrine in the
presence of multiple defendants.
II. THE EFFECT OF ALLEGATIONS OF SPECIFIC
NEGLIGENCE IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
A. The General Position
Courts throughout the United States have adopted several positions
regarding the effect of the nature of the allegations in the pleadings. 20
In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff loses his right to rely upon, or have
the jury instructed on, res ipsa loquitur if he alleges specific acts of
negligence in his complaint.21 Other jurisdictions have held that the
plaintiff may use an inference of negligence drawn from the circum-
stances of the injury only if the inference supports the specific alle-
gation of negligence. 22 A third position is that res ipsa loquitur may be
applied when specific acts of negligence have been alleged only if the
pleadings also include general allegations of negligence. 23 One difficulty
with the last approach is the problem of distinguishing specific from
general allegations of negligence. 24 Under a fourth rule, res ipsa loquitur
is available without respect to the form of the pleading.25 This position
allows plaintiff to allege specific negligence alone and still avail himself
of the doctrine.
B. The Montana Position
The cumulative result of the Montana cases on the effect of alleging
specific negligence was unclear until Whitney v. Northwest Greyhound
038 AM JUR., Negligence, §§ 261, 263.
'Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Conner, 217 F. 956 (8th Cir. 1914); O'Rourke v. Marshall
Field & Co., 307 1ll. 197, 138 N.E. 625 (1923).
2'Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, 44 Ariz. 174, 36 P.2d 168 (1934); Atkinson v.
United Railroads of S.F., 71 Cal. App. 82, 234 P. 863 (1925); Terre Haute & I.R.R.
Co. v. Sheeks, 155 Ind. 74, 56 N.E. 434 (1900); Alabama & V.Ry. Co. v. Groome,
97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703 (1910).
23Wass v. Suter, 119 Ind. App. 114, 84 N.E.2d 734 (1949); Rauch v. Des Moines Elec.
Co., 206 Iowa 309, 218 N.W. 340 (1928); McDonough v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 208
Mass. 436, 94 N.E. 809 (1911); Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 625,
253 S.W.2d 97 (1952).
nOne offered distinction between specific and general allegations of negligence was:
For example, an allegation that a railroad crossing accident was caused
by the failure of automatic warning devices to operate is pointed at
establishing only that such devices do not ordinarily fail to operate in
the absence of negligence. Hence, this is a general allegation. If, however,
it is alleged that the accident was caused by the failure of an intoxicated
gate tender in the employ of the defendant to lower the gates, the allega-
tion is one pointing to the precise negligence which caused the accident.
In the latter example there is a specific allegation. 27 FORD. L. REV.
411 (1958), noting New York Chicago, St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Henderson,
146 N.E.2d 531 (Ind. 1957).
See also Radisch v. Franco-Italian Packing Co., 68 Cal. App. 2d 825, 158 P.2d 435
(1945).
2'Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 175 A. 679 (1934) ; Dearden v. San
Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 33 Utah 147, 93 P. 271 (1907).
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Lines, Inc. 26 was decided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1952. The
Whitney decision made it clear that res ipsa loquitur is available in
Montana regardless of the form of the pleading.
Most of the cases tried prior to 1952 in which the plaintiff sought
application of res ipsa loquitur were cases in which the complaint sounded
in terms of general negligence. 2T In those cases the court's decisions as
to the doctrine's applicability were based on factors other than the
form of the complaint. This is not surprising as res ipsa loquitur is
normally alleged in general terms. Thus, judicial examination of the
effect of the allegations upon the applicability of the doctrine is usually
found only in cases in which the defendant complains that the plaintiff
has pleaded specific negligence. The first such case reported in Mon-
tana was Lyon v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co.28 There, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was negligent in excavating a borrow pit to a
point so close to the river that the remaining embankment was insuffi-
cient in thickness and strength to retain the river within its natural
channel, and that because of such negligence the embankment gave way,
resulting in damage to plaintiff's property. At trial, plaintiff intro-
duced evidence of the specific facts alleged in her complaint. However,
the jury found for the defendant who introduced evidence that the
damage was caused by water overflowing a slough maintained by the
plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff attempted to rely on res ipsa loquitur.
In rejecting the doctrine's applicability the court based its decision
on two grounds, i.e., not only had plaintiff alleged specific negligence,
but she also had produced specific evidence of negligence sufficient
to make out a prima facie case. By basing its holding on both the
pleadings and the proof the court left unanswered the question of
whether allegations of specific negligence were a sufficient basis alone
upon which to reject the applicability of res ipsa loquitur.
The Montana Supreme Court's next reference to the effect of plead-
ings in res ipsa loquitur cases was in Vonault v. O'Rourke.2 9 There, the
defendant appealed on the ground that the complaint did not state a
cause of action because it was couched in terms of general negligence.
The court held that this did not preclude plaintiff's recovery on the
res ipsa loquitur theory and further recognized, in dicta, that there
was authority for holding that if the complaint had been any more
1125 Mont. 528, 242 P.2d 257 (1952).
"See e.g., Houle v. Helena Gas & Elec., supra note 18; Harding v. Johnson, supra note
16; Vonault v. O 'Rourke, supra note 6; Maki v. Murray Hosp., supra note 9; Childers
v. Deschamps, 87 Mont. 505, 290 P. 261 (1930); John v. Northern Pac. iRy. Co.,
supra note 17.
1150 Mont. 532, 148 P. 386 (1915).
2997 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934); The court passed up an opportunity to examine
the effect of the pleadings on the applicability of the doctrine in Childers v. Des-
champs, supra note 27. In that case the plaintiff alleged the cause of her injury in
detail. The court denied her recovery under res ipsa loquitur, but based its holding on
the fact that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent.
[Vol. 29
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specific in its allegations, it would have been fatal to plaintiff's reliance
on the doctrine.
30
In light of the Lyon and the Vonault decisions it is not surprising
that nearly two decades passed without the subject receiving attention in
reported cases. It was not until 1952 when the Whitney case was decided
that the court spoke again on the effect of pleadings in res ipsa loquitur
cases. In Whitney the plaintiff alleged that when the driver of a bus
in which she was a passenger, attempted to pass another vehicle, he
drove so far over on the left side of the highway that the bus went off
the road and overturned, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. At trial,
the verdict was for the defendant. The trial court had given an in-
struction which was inconsistent with plaintiff's proffered theory of
res ipsa loquitur and plaintiff appealed. The defendant, using the same
reasoning espoused by the Lyon court, contended that the plaintiff was
not entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur because she had attempted to
both plead and prove specific acts of negligence. For the first time
the court focused directly on the question of whether specific allegations
of negligence were a bar to the doctrine's applicability. The court
denied the defendant's contention that the complaint alleged specific
negligence and held it was a general allegation. Nonetheless, said the
court:
... Where res ipsa loquitur is otherwise applicable, a plaintiff does
not lose the benefit of that presumption by alleging specific acts of
negligence of the [defendant] which he fails to prove . . .31
The defendant in Whitne!j relied on the Lyon rationale. In rejecting
that rationale, the court in the Whitney case appears to have reversed,
sub silencio, its prior holding in Lyon. The Whitney case has been cited
with approval in subsequent Montana cases.32 In those cases the court has
seemingly regarded as immaterial the effect of the allegations. Thus,
in Montana, the nature of the allegations in the complaint will not be
the determining factor of the doctrine's applicability. Therefore, plain-
tiff's attorneys should be able to allege specific acts of negligence in
'
0The authority recognized in Vonault was 45 C.J. 1225. The court also relied on Pierce
v. Great Falls & C. Ry. Co., 22 Mont. 445, 56 P. 867 (1899), for the proposition that
general allegations were "sufficient" upon which to base a cause of action under
res ipsa loquitur. The report of the Pierce case, however, does not specifically
indicate that the plaintiff therein sought to rely on res ipsa loquitur. However, it
does say that because the plaintiff had alleged specific negligence, "' [s]he could not
recover for negligence in any other respect, for a plaintiff must stand on the cause
of action alleged in the complaint." 22 Mont. at 448, 56 P. at 868 (emphasis added).
11 2 5 Mont. at 535, 242 P.2d at 261, citing Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Patterson, 14
Tenn. App. 652, 657.
2Davis v. Trobough, 139 Mont. 322, 326, 363 P.2d 727 (1961); Stocking v. Johnson
Flying Service, supra note 6 at 316; Jackson v. Dingwall, 145 Mont. 127, 136, 399
P.2d 236, 241 (1965); Krohmer v. Dal, 145 Mont. 491, 498, 402 P.2d 979, 983
(1965) ; Bostwick v. Butte Motor Co., 145 Mont. 570, 590, 403 P.2d 614, 625 (1965);
Baumgartner v. National Cash Register Co., 146 Mont. 346, 353, 406 P.2d 686, 690
(1965); Pollard v. Todd, 418 P.2d 869, 872 (1966); Gormley v. Montana Deaconess
Hosp., supra note 3 at 304; Baker v. Rental Service co., 24 St. Rep. 701, 432 P.2d
624, 628 (1967) ; Knowlton v. Sandaker, supra note 4.
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their complaint without fear of denying their client the right to rely
on the doctrine.
II. THE EFFECT OF PLAINTIFF'S INTRODUCTION
OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WHICH TENDS TO
SHOW THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF THE INJURY
A. Generally
Plaintiff's attorney is frequently confronted with the question of
how much negligence he can establish without jeopardizing his right to
have the jury instructed on res ipsa loquitur. If he elects not to offer
that evidence of negligence that is available to him, he affords the de-
fendant the first opportunity to reveal the details of the occurrence
which caused the injury. Plaintiff's subsequent rebuttal, or lack thereof,
may then raise an insurmountable inference that his cause is really one
of desperation.
There are only two situations where the plaintiff's attorney is not
confronted with this problem. One is in cases where he has sufficient
evidence to prove that the defendant's negligence was the cause of
his client's injury. In such cases it is axiomatic that res ipsa loquitur
is not applicable and plaintiff will proceed on a specific negligence
theory alone. The other situation is where the causation evidence is
exclusively within the defendant's own knowledge.3 3 In such cases it
is evident that res ipsa loquitur is the only theory available to plaintiff.
Between these two extremes are those cases in which the quantum
of proof of defendant's negligence which is available to plaintiff is
insufficient to make out a case based on specific negligence, but it is
more than the usual absence of proof generally characteristic of a res
ipsa case. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's attorney encounters
the problem of how much to prove without proving too much, and thus
losing his right to rely on the doctrine.
An excellent illustration of this predicament is found in Hickory
Transfer Co. v. Nezbed.3 4 From the facts it appeared that plaintiff's case
was suited to an application of the res ipsa loquitur theory. The plain-
tiffs had been awakened in the middle of the night when a tractor-trailer
unit crashed into their home, resulting in extensive damages to the
house and in injuries to plaintiff and his wife. The facts showed that
the defendant was driving a tractor-trailer unit on a boulevard highway,
and seeing no traffic light at the intersection, entered it 'without de-
creasing his speed. In the intersection the truck collided with a car
'3This situation frequently arises in product liability cases. For a discussion of the
doctrine 's applicability in such cases see HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIL-
ITY, §§ 2:104, 2:105, 2:108, 2:117-120. For a discussion of res ipsa loquitur 's appli-
cability in products liability cases dealing with automobiles, see GILLIAM, PaODUCTS
LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 150-160 (1960).
3
4Supra note 8.
[Vol. 29
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driven by Baugher, who had entered the intersection from the truck's
left. Unknown to either driver, the traffic light at the intersection was
defective. At the time of the collision it showed no light to the truck
driver, but showed a green light to Baugher. As a result of the im-
pact the truck was propelled into plaintiff's house. Plaintiff sued the
trucking company, the truck driver, and Baugher. The jury found in
favor of Baugher, but against the trucking company and its driver,
both of whom appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that
because of the extent of plaintiff's proof, he had lost the right to rely
on res ipsa loquitur. At trial, plaintiff could and did offer evidence
that there were no skid marks, but also that there was evidence of
brake failure.
The plaintiff proved that the brakes on the truck had failed. The
appellate court said that this proof rebutted any possible inference,
from the absence of skid marks, that the truck driver had failed to
apply his brakes. Further, if the brakes failed after the first collision
as a result of the brake lines being severed by Baugher's car, then
Baugher and not the truck driver would be at fault. On the other hand,
if they falied before the collision with Baugher, then the truck driver
would still be free of negligence, as mere brake failure is not in itself
evidence of negligence.3 5 Consequently, the court held that plaintiff's
own proof of the details precluded his reliance on res ipsa loquitur, and
stated that plaintiff had explained away the possible inference of
negligence. "Paradoxically," the court said, "the plaintiffs proved too
much and too little".3 6
The various jurisdictions are in conflict with respect to the effect
of plaintiff's introduction of evidence of specific negligence upon his
ultimate ability to rely on res ipsa loquitur. Most courts hold that an
unsuccessful attempt by plaintiff to demonstrate the precise cause of
the injury will not deprive him of the benefits of the doctrine.37 There
are jurisdictions however which deny plaintiff the right to use res ipsa
loquitur if he introduces any evidence of specific negligence.3 8 In some
cases it is held that if plaintiff's evidence of specific negligence raises
an issue of causation for the jury, the jury may not be charged under
res ipsa loquitur as the plaintiff, by his proof, has waived his right to
have the jury give him the benefit of the inference which flows from
the doctrine.39 These last cases proceed upon the theory that res ipsa
'Supra note 8, citing Schaeffer v. Caldwell, 273 App. Div. 263, 78 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1948).
'Supra note 8 at 245.
nPennsylvania Co. v. Clark, 266 F. 182 (6th Cir. 1920); Scott v. Kreeley Joslen Store
Co., 125 Colo. 367, 243 P.2d 394 (1952); Conner v. Atchison T. & S.F.R.R. Co.,
189 Cal. 1, 207 P. 378 (1933); Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 956, 38 N.W.2d
761 (1949) ; the cases are collected at 33 A.L.R.2d 792, 796.
' jackson v. 919 Corporation, 344 Ill. App. 519, 101 N.E.2d 594 (1951); Bollenbach v.
Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670 (1930); Kaltenbach v. Cleveland, C. & C.
Highway Inc., 82 Ohio App. 10, 80 N.E.2d 640 (1948).
'Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., 173 Minn. 215, 217 N.W. 102 (1927); Berry
v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825 (1938).
1968]
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loquitur is available only of necessity and therefore when plaintiff does
not need the benefit of the inference it will not be available to him.
A more liberal rule which permits the jury to consider both res ipsa
loquitur and any amount of specific negligence introduced by plaintiff
is applied in several jurisdictions.40
B. Montana Decisions
The Montana position has gradually evolved into a liberal approach
to this problem. In 1915, the court in the Lyon case held that if it was
possible for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case based on spe-
cific negligence, res ipsa loquitur could not be invoked. Thus, since the
plaintiff offered direct proof of specific negligence, the doctrine was
held inapplicable. This rule was followed 41 until 1952 when the Whitney
decision held that the plaintiff was not deprived of his ability to rely
on res ipsa loquitur simply by introducing evidence of specific acts
of negligence which did not prove to be the precise cause of the injury.
In 1965 the Ninth Circuit, in Stiles v. Gove 42 further liberalized
the rule announced in Whitney. In Stiles, the plaintiff presented a prima
facie case based on specific negligence. However, the defendant offered
evidence disputing plaintiff's proof and the court allowed application
of the doctrine on the ground that the "precise cause of the [accident]
was not shown beyond dispute".43
Consequently, in an otherwise applicable case, a plaintiff in Mon-
tana is well advised to request an instruction on res ipsa loquitur even if
he has produced evidence of specific negligence, provided that the
evidence he has adduced either does not clearly establish the precise
cause of the injury or the defendant has offered evidence disputing its
cause. Thus, it appears that in Montana, after specific evidence of
negligence has been offered and disputed, the biggest problem will be
to frame a clear charge to the jury to the effect that they may consider
res ipsa loquitur along with specific evidence of negligence.
IV. OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN THE
PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
A. Generally
Subsidiary problems arise in the cases in which there are multiple
defendants. There are holdings to the effect that the plaintiff may apply
res ipsa loquitur against one defendant and at the same time introduce
1°Leet v. Union Pae. R.R. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944); Cassady v. Old
Colony Street Ry Co., 184 Mass. 156, 68 N.E. 10 (1903); Cullen v. Pearson, 191
Minn. 136, 253 N.W. 117 (1934); Cleary v. Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215, 192 A. 29
(1937).
"See Childers v. Deschamps, supra note 27.
42Supra note 15.
11345 F.2d at 993 (emphasis added).
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acts of specific negligence against another. 44 Most of these cases involve
passengers in carriers which are involved in collisions with third parties
and are probably explained on the carrier-passenger relationship rather
than on res ipsa loquitur.45 So too, where the defendant's evidence tends
to establish specific proof of the cause of the injury or where the plain-
tiff develops specific evidence of negligence on cross examination of
defendant's witnesses, it is generally held that plaintiff still retains the
benefit of the inference flowing from res ipsa loquitur.
46
The real problem here is one of showing exclusive control of the
instrumentality, so as to make res ipsa loquitur applicable. It is en-
tirely possible that two defendants may be in joint control of a single
instrumentality. However, in Schroder v. City & County Savings Bank,
Albany47 the courts wrote: "It is not necessary for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine that there be but a single person in control
of that which caused the damage".
4 8
B. In Montana
There is as yet no Montana case reported involving the applicability
of the doctrine when there are multiple defendants. However, it is
submitted that when such a case does arise, the plaintiff should be able
to show by direct evidence which defendant had control. If this can
be done and the other requirements of res ipsa loquitur are met, then
the plaintiff has a prima facie case. If this cannot be done by plaintiff,
then the defendant's evidence will usually establish the necessary con-
trol or lack thereof because they will be anxious to avoid application
of the doctrine against themselves.
V. CONCLUSION
In Montana, a plaintiff's complaint may contain allegations of
specific negligence without endangering his right to rely on res ipsa
loquitur. A plaintiff will not lose his ability to rely on the doctrine
by offering evidence which tends to show the cause of his injury, pro-
vided his evidence falls short of proving the precise cause, or provided
that the defendant's evidence substantially rebuts plgintiff's proof. In
cases where plaintiff must proceed against more than one defendant,
he should be able to utilize res ipsa loquitur against one or both if he
"See eg., Kilgore v. Brown, 90 Cal. App. 555, 266 P. 297 (1928); Rothweiler v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 259, 234 S.W.2d 552 (1950).
'"See Prosser, lBes Ipsa Loquitur, Collisions of Carriers With Other Vehicles, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 980 (1936). Montana places a high duty of care on carriers. See REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 8-405, 406. See also Heck v. N.P. Ry. Co., 59 Mont. 106, 196
P. 521 (1921).
"Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), Phillbert v. Benj.
Ansehl Co., 342 Mo. 1239, 119 S.W.2d 797 (1938).
'1293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
'Id., at 59.
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can establish who had control of the injury-producing instrumentality.
In cases in which plaintiff cannot establish which defendant had control,
the defendants' evidence will usually supply this element becaus eof
their interest in escaping individual liability.
DOUGLAS J. WOLD
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